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Set-Offs Against Back Pay Awards Under the Federal Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act 
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act1 (ADEA) prohibits 
arbitrary age discrimination by employment agencies, labor organi-
zations, and employers2 against individuals between the ages of forty 
and seventy.3 While Congress patterned the ADEA's substantive 
provisions after the prohibitions against racial discrimination of Ti-
tle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,4 the statute's remedial provi-
sions "essentially follow those of the Fair Labor Standards Act"5 
(FLSA). The FLSA, which establishes minimum wage rates and 
maximum hour requirements, 6 affords supplemental pay to employ-
ees for hours actually worked. But the ADEA provides damages to 
replace the compensation that the victim of a discriminatory termi-
nation or refusal to hire would have earned. 7 In most FLSA cases, 
the plaintiff remains employed and has had no opportunity for 
outside gains to offset the damages caused by her employer's viola-
tion. In ADEA cases, however, a plantiff may have mitigated a dis-
criminatory act's impact with income from substitute employment, 
unemployment compensation, retirement benefits, welfare payments, 
and other sources. Consequently, in ADEA cases, unlike most 
FLSA cases, 8 courts must decide whether to subtract certain types of 
l. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976, Supp. II 
1978 & Supp. III 1979)). 
2. "The term 'employer' means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who 
has twenty or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks 
in the current or preceding calendar year .••. " 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1976). 
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 623, 631 (1976), as amended by Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 12, 92 Stat. 189. 
As originally enacted in 1967, the ADEA protected workers between the ages of forty and 
sixty-five. In 1978, Congress extended the upper age limit of the Act to age seventy. 
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976). "[T]he prohibitions of the ADEA were derived in haec verba 
from Title VII." Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978). Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)(l) (unlawful for employers "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual ... 
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin"), with 29 U.S.C. § 
623(a){l) (1976) (unlawful for employers "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individ-
ual • . . because of such individual's age"). 
5. H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1967] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. 
NEWS 2213, 2218; S. REP. No. 723, 90th Cong. 1st Sess. (1967), reprinted in part in 113 CONG. 
REc. 31,249 (1967). The FLSA is codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976) (amended 1977). 
6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
7. The ADEA also prohibits discriminatory promotion practices, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) 
(1976) (amended 1978), but cases involving such practices do not raise the issue addressed by 
this Note. 
8 . .But see Marshall .;_ Great Lakes Recreation Co., 2 LAB. L. REP. (CCH) (90 Lab. Cas.) 
f 33,959 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 8, 1981); Wirtz v. Southern Seating Inc., 59 Lab. Cas. 43,653 (M.D. 
1113 
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payments received by the plaintiff after the discriminatory act from 
back pay awards. 
Courts that have addressed this "set-ofl'' question have reached 
inconsistent results. Although they agree that the ADEA's damage 
provisions seek to make plaintiffs whole,9 they differ as to which set-
offs the make-whole standard requires. Many courts have reduced 
monetary awards by wages earned at another job,10 or by other in-
come that the plaintiff would not have received absent the discrimi-
nation.11 Others have refused to order such set-offs.12 Still others 
Fla. 1968); Mitchell v. Dyess, 180 F. Supp. 852 (S.D. Ala. 1960). These cases arose under 
§ 15(a)(3) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1976), which prohibits retaliatory discharge of 
employees who attempt to enforce the FLSA. 
9. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sandia Corp., 23 Empl. Prac. Dec. 17,121, 17,142 (10th Cir. 1980); 
Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1238 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. de11ied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978). 
IO. Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. de11ied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978); 
Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1975); Brennan v. Ace Hardware Corp., 495 
F.2d 368, 373 (8th Cir. 1974) (dicta); Moysey v. Andrus, 22 Empl. Prac. Dec. 15,325-3 (D.D.C. 
1980); EEOC v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 22 Empl. Prac. Dec. 14,693 (W.D. Tenn. 1980); 
Scofield v. Bolts & Bolts Retail Stores, Inc., 20 Empl. Prac. Dec. 12,299 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) 
(dicta); Buchholz v. Symons Mfg. Co., 445 F. Supp. 706, 712 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (dicta); Coates v. 
National Cash Register Co., 433 F. Supp. 655 (W.D. Va. 1977); Combes v. Griffin Television, 
Inc., 421 F. Supp. 841 (W.D. Okla. 1976); Hodgson v. Ideal Corrugated Box Co., 8 Empl. Prac. 
Dec. 6366 (N.D. W. Va. 1974); Bishop v. Jelleff Assocs., 398 F. Supp. 579 (D.D.C. 1974); 
Monroe v. Penn-Dixie Corp., 335 F. Supp. 231, 234-35 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (dicta). 
11. EEOC v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 22 Empl. Prac. Dec. 14,693 (W.D. Tenn. 1980) 
(unemployment compensation); Buchholz v. Symons Mfg. Co., 445 F. Supp. 706 (E.D. Wis. 
1978) (unemployment compensation); Coates v. National Cash Register Co., 433 F. Supp. 655 
(W.D. Va. 1977) (unemployment compensation); Bishop v. Jelleff Assocs., 398 F. Supp. 579 
(D.D.C. 1974) (unemployment compensation); Hodgson v. Ideal Corrugated Box Co., 8 Empl. 
Prac. Dec. 6366 (N.D. W. Va. 1974) (unemployment compensation); Schulz v. Hickok Mfg. 
Co., 358 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (unemployment compensation). 
12. EEOC v. Sandia Corp., 23 Empl. Prac. Dec. 17,121, 17,140-42 (10th Cir. 1980) (unem-
ployment compensation); Marshall v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 554 F.2d 730, 736 (5th 
Cir. 1977) (unemployment compensation); Scofield v. Bolts & Bolts Retail Stores, Inc., 20 
Empl. Prac. Dec. 12,299, at 12,302 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (unemployment compensation); Marshall 
v. Arlene Knitwear, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 715, 730 n.20 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (unemployment compen-
sation), qffd in part, revd in part and remanded, 608 F.2d 1369 (2d Cir. 1979). EEOC v. Sandia 
Corp. looked to the source of the benefit to decide whether to reduce the back pay award. The 
court set off severance pay provided by the defendant employer but not unemployment com-
pensation because it was derived from a "collateral" source. 23 Empl. Prac, Dec. at 17,141-42. 
Both EEOC v. Sandia Corp., 23 Empl. Prac. Dec. at 17,140-42, and Marshall v. Goodyear Tire 
& Rubber Co., 554 F.2d at 736, held set-offs discretionary with the court. 
All courts to consider the issue have set off actual earnings, but some courts that did not 
decide the matter have suggested that they might not. Courts are also split over whether 
amounts earnable ought to be set off from ADEA damages. Compare EEOC v. Goodyear Tire 
& Rubber Co., 22 Empl. Prac. Dec. 14,693 (W.D. Tenn. 1980); Marshall v. Arlene Knitwear, 
Inc., 454 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), qffd in part, revd in part and remanded, 608 F.2d 1369 
(2d Cir. 1979); Buchholz v. Symons Mfg. Co., 445 F. Supp. 706 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (allowing set-
off of amounts eamable), with Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 
436 U.S. 913 (1978); Combes v. Griffin Television, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 841 (W.D. Okla. 1976); 
Bishop v. Jelleff Assocs., 398 F. Supp. 579 (D.D.C. 1974) (disallowing set-off of amounts earn-
able). Courts should set off amounts the plaintiff could have earned if Congress intended to 
adopt the general mitigation principle that requires reasonable efforts to find substitute em-
ployment. See, e.g., 11 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1359 (1968). Congress, however, was 
· -·mindful of the obstacles faced by older job-seekers. See, e.g., 113 CONG. REc. 34,744-45, 
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have set off only some of the benefits received by the plainti.ff. 13 The 
uncertainty arising from these inconsistent results frustrates efforts to 
settle ADEA disputes through conciliation and mediation, the pre-
ferred methods of enforcing the Act. 14 
This Note proposes a theory to govern set-offs against ADEA 
damage awards that best effectuates congressional ~tent. It suggests 
that courts should set off those types of benefits received after a vio-
lation that, had they been lost because of a violation, would have 
been included in the damage award. Part I identifies the proper 
measure of damages under the ADEA as the net loss of 'job-related 
benefits," doubled in cases of willful violation. It explains first that 
job-related benefits should be broadly defined to include unemploy-
ment compensation and social security benefits as well as wages, and 
second that the congressional desire to make victims of age discrimi-
nation "whole" is best served by awarding the net loss of these job-
related benefits rather than the full loss of back pay - that is, by 
allowing some set-offs. Part II discusses which set-offs are appropri-
ate, concluding that set-offs should include all employment-related 
gains received by the plaintiff, but not income generated indepen-
dently of an employment relation. 
I 
The ADEA provides that its prohibitions against age discrimina-
tion shall be enforced in accordance with certain of "the powers, 
remedies, and procedures"15 of the FLSA. Violators of the FLSA 
"are liable to . . . employees affected in the amount of their unpaid 
34,751 (1967) (remarks of Reps. Perkins, Pucinski, Eilberg and Dwyer). The issues raised by a 
mitigation requirement under these circumstances are beyond the scope of this Note. 
13. See, e.g., Wise v. Olan Mills Inc., 495 F. Supp. 257 (D. Colo. 1980) (setting off private 
pension benefits, but not social security payments). 
14. See text at note 39 i'!fra. 
15. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976). The section provides: 
The provisions of this chapter shall be enforced in accordance with the powers, reme-
dies, and procedures provided in sections 21 l{b), 216 (except for subsection (a) thereof), 
and 217 of this title, and subsection (c) of this section [remedial provisions of the FSLAJ. 
Any act prohibited under section 623 of this title shall be deemed to be a prohibited act 
under section 215 of this title. Amounts owing to a person as a result ofa violation of this 
chapter shall be deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation 
for purposes of sections 216 and 217 of this title: Provided, That liquidated damages shall 
be payable only in cases of willful violations of this chapter. In any action brought to 
enforce this chapter the court shall have jurisdiction to grant such legal or equitable relief 
as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this chapter, including without limita-
tion judgments compelling employment, reinstatement or promotion, or enforcing the lia-
bility for amounts deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime 
compensation under this section. Before instituting any action under this section, the Sec-
retary shall attempt to eliminate the discriminatory practice or practices alleged, and to 
effect voluntary compliance with the requirements of this chapter through informal meth-
ods of conciliation,conference, and persuasion. 
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minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case 
may be, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated dam-
ages."16 For the purpose of applying the FLSA's remedial provi-
sions, "[a]mounts owing to a person as a result of a violation" of the 
ADEA are "deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid over-
time compensation,"17 and liquidated damages are recoverable only 
for willful violations.18 But the ADEA does not indicate what 
"amounts" are "owing," and the courts have had to develop the 
measure of damages on their own. The Supreme Court has con-
strued the ADEA to authorize actions for "lost wages," 19 and the 
Conference Report on the 1978 ADEA amendments defined 
"amounts owing" to include "items of pecuniary or economic loss 
such as wages, fringe, and other job-related benefits."20 
Congress's inclusion of 'job-related benefits" in the base mone-
tary remedy appears designed to compensate discriminatees for all 
the pecuniary benefits that would have received from an employ-
ment relation. The ADEA thus protects a package of benefits that 
includes much more than an employee's salary. Although the value 
of certain entitlements might be difficult to estimate,21 courts have 
included in damage assessments pensions, insurance plans, and other 
fringe benefits that a worker would have received absent the discrim-
ination.22 The same logic suggests that the ADEA's protection 
16. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (Supp. III 1979). 
17. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976). The significance of the equation of ADEA "amounts ow-
ing" with FLSA ''unpaid minimum wages" and ''unpaid overtime compensation" is that dam-
ages under the ADEA thus become mandatory rather than discretionary with the court. See 
Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978). Further, under both Acts, either the Government 
or an aggrieved individual may bring an enforcement action. 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(c), 217, 626(b), 
626(c) (1976). 
Following the model of the FLSA, the ADEA establishes two primary enforcement 
mechanisms. Under the FLSA provisions incorporated in§ 7(b) of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 626(b ), the Secretary of Labor may bring suit on behalf of an aggrieved individual for 
injunctive and monetary relief. 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(c), 217 (1970 ed. and Supp. V). The 
inco!florated FLSA provisions together with § 7(c) of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. !:j 626(c), in 
addition, authorize private civil actions for "such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate 
the purposes of'' the ADEA. 
Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 579 (1978). 
Authority to enforce the ADEA was transferred from the Secretary of Labor to the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission pursuant to Reorg. Plan. No. 1 of 1978, 3 C.F.R. 404 
(1980), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app., at 289 (Supp. II 1978). 
18. 29 u.s.c. § 626(b) (1976). 
19. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 582 (1978). 
20. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in [1978) U.S. Coon 
CONG. & AD. NEWS 504, 535. 
21. See Hodgson v. Ideal Corrugated Box Co., 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6366, 6374 (N.D. W. Va. 
1974) (denying recovery of pension and bonus as too speculative). 
22. Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1021 (1st Cir. 1979) ("Pension benefits are part of 
an individual's compensation and, like an award of back pay, should be awarded under 29 
U.S.C. § 626(b)."); EEOC v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 22 Empl. Proc. Dec. 14,693, 14,694 
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should extend to unemployment compensation and social security 
benefits lost because of discrimination. Although payment is de-
ferred, an employee, in effect, earns both unemployment compensa-
tion and social security benefits while she is working.23 
Discrimination could threaten these benefits in a variety of ways. 
For example, because an individual must work a certain number of 
quarters to attain fully-insured social security status, a discrimina-
tory discharge or refusal to hire could jeopardize her eligibility or 
permanently reduce her benefit levels.24 Similarly, the timing of a 
discriminatory discharge may affect a worker's eligibility for unem-
ployment compensation. Since Congress used sweeping language to 
define the ADEA's package of protected benefits, it is reasonable to 
infer an intent not only to guarantee older workers current income, 
but also to allow them to earn their eligibility for programs designed 
to protect against layoffs and secure retirement income. 25 
The protection afforded by the ADEA, though broad, is not un-
limited. Congress did not seek to compensate for personal injuries, 26 
and thus did not authorize the recovery of general consequential 
damages other than through the ADEA's liquidated damages provi-
sion.27 The requirement that losses be 'job-related" limits recovery 
to those pecuniary benefits connected to the employment relation, 
and courts generally have refused to compensate plaintiffs for non-
pecuniary losses such as pain and suffering. 28 
(W.D. Tenn. 1980) (allowing recovery of fringes withheld); Marshall v. Arlene Knitwear, 454 
F. Supp. 715, 730 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (allowing recovery of pension benefits), affd in part, revd in 
part and remanded, 608 F.2d 1369 (2d Cir. 1979); Buchholz v. Symons Mfg. Co., 445 F. Supp. 
706, 713 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (allowing recovery of pension benefits); Combes v. Griffin Televi-
sion, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 841, 843-44 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (awarding back pay, cost of living 
increases, "talent fees," value of company-paid health and life insurance benefits, and profit-
sharing benefits); Bishop v. Jelleff Assocs., 398 F. Supp. 579, 596 (D.D.C. 1974) (awarding 
relief including "back pay, reinstatement and restoration of employee benefits"). 
23. See NLRB v. Marshall Field & Co., 129 F.2d 169, 173 (7th Cir.) (Evans, J., dissenting), 
ajfdpercuriam, 318 U.S. 253 (1942). 
24. See [1981] I UNEMPL. INS. REP. (CCH) ~~ 12,101, 12,109. 
25. See Blim v. Western Elec. Co., 496 F. Supp. 818, 822 (W.D. Okla. 1980); Mistretta v. 
Sandia Corp., 18 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5527, 5530-38 (D. N.M. 1978). 
"26. See, e.g., Sant v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 621, 622 (N.D. Cal. 1976). 
27. See, e.g., Dean v. American Sec. Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036, 1038-39 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. 
denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978). 
28. See EEOC v. Sandia Corp., 23 Empl. Prac. Dec. 17,121, 17,142 (10th Cir. 1980) ("Back 
pay awards seek to make whole discharged employees for their lost wages and not for extra 
expenses"). Cases denying damages for pain and suffering include Slatin v. Stanford Research 
Inst., 590 F.2d 1292 (4th Cir. 1979); Vasquez v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 579 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 
1978); Dean v. American Security Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1977); Rogers v. Exxon 
Research & Engr. Co., 550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978); Crispen 
v. Southern Cross Indus., 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 405 (N.D. Ga. 1977); Sant v. Mack Trucks, 
Inc., 424 F. Supp. 621 (N.D. Cal. 1976). Schlicke v. Allen-Bradley Co., 448 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. 
Wis. 1978), denied damages for injury to reputation. 
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While Congress indicated that it designed the ADEA to compen-
sate for only a limited class of injuries, it failed to clarify whether the 
"loss" recoverable by victims of discrimination is the net loss of 
'job-related benefits" or the full amount of back pay. Because the 
ADEA does not explicitly provide for set-offs, plaintiffs can argue 
that Congress did not intend to limit awards to net loss. However, 
"the absence of express set-off language in the ADEA enforcement 
provisions does not compel the inference that Congress intended to 
preclude set-offs."29 Awareness of the common-law tradition of set-
offs30 and court-ordered set-offs under the FLSA31 might have led 
Congress to conclude that an explicit set-off provision was unneces-
sary. The more reasonable conclusion is that Congress simply did 
not consider the problem. 32 The lack of congressional guidance re-
quires that courts resolve the question by looking to the ADEA's 
purposes. Remedial provisions generally should further the pur-
poses of anti-discrimination statutes,33 and the ADEA specifically 
directs that courts "grant such legal or equitable relief as may be 
appropriate to effectuate the purposes" of the Act. 34 
Congress enacted the ADEA "to promote employment of older 
persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary 
age discrimination in employment; [and] to help employers and 
workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of 
age on employment."35 Damage awards under the ADEA serve two 
major functions: 
First, the prospect of economic penalties more certainly deters illegal 
employment practice than does exposure to injunctive relief or pro-
spective equitable remedies such as reinstatement. Second, economic 
exactions recompense individuals for injuries inflicted by employers' 
discriminatory conduct.36 
Although either a full back pay award or one limited to the net loss 
29. Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1243 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 
(1978). 
30. See C. McCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES§ 160 (1935), 
31. See, e.g., note 8 supra. 
32. Because most FLSA cases do not involve set-off questions, see text at notes 7-9 StJpra, 
Congress could have overlooked the need for set-off provisions when incorporating the 
FLSA's remedial provisions in the ADEA. 
33. See Rodrigu'ez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1237 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 
(1978). 
34. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976). Section 626(c) similarly provides: "Any person aggrieved 
may bring a civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction for such legal or equitable relief 
as will effectuate the purposes of this chapter .... " 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (1976), 
35. 29 U.S.C. § 62l(b) (1976). 
36. Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1237 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 
(1978). 
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of ':iob-related benefits" would have deterrent and compensatory ef-
fects, the Act's approach to age discrimination suggests that the net-
loss measure of damages is more appropriate. Admittedly, the 
greater awards that result when courts deny set-offs would increase 
deterrence. But Congress did not intend to induce compliance 
through fear of heavy financial penalties. Rather, Congress believed 
that the ADEA's purposes would be served primarily through concil-
iation and friendly persuasion. At least one representative empha-
sized that age discrimination, unlike race discrimination, is not based 
on pervasive societal prejudice, but rather on misperceptions of the 
older worker's ability to function on the job.37 To eliminate these 
misperceptions, the ADEA established "a continuing program of ed-
ucation and information."38 Further, conciliation and mediation are 
the preferred methods of enforcing the Act.39 According to Senator 
Javits, one of the bill's sponsors, Congress designed the ADEA's en-
forcement scheme "to carry out this age-discrimination-in-employ-
ment ban with the least overanxiety or difficulty on the part of 
American business, and with complete fairness to the workers."40 In 
addition, the 1978 Conference Report indicates that Congress did 
not sanction punitive damages;41 instead it authorized damage 
awards that would compensate for job-related losses.42 Courts will 
effectuate this make-whole relief objective only if they calculate back 
37. Age discrimination is not the same as the insidious discrimination based on race or 
creed prejudices and bigotry. These [racial] discriminations result in nonemployment be-
cause of feelings about a person entirely unrelated to his ability to do a job. This is hardly 
a problem for the older job-seeker. Discrimination arises for him because of assumptions 
that are made about the effects of age on performance. 
113 CONG. REC. 34,742 (1967) (remarks of Rep. Burke). 
38. 29 U.S.C. § 622(a) (1976). 
39. See H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 10, reprinted in (1967] U.S. CODE 
CONG. & Ao. NEWS 2213, 2220, 2223; s. REP. No. 723, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., I, 5, IO (1967), 
reprinted in 113 CONG. REC. 31,249, 31,250, 31,252 (1967); Statement by the President After 
Signing Bill Prohibiting Improper Age Discrimination in Employment, 3 WEEKLY COMP. OF 
PRES. Doc. 1736 (Dec. 16, 1967). 
The ADEA requires the Secretary of Labor to attempt conciliation between the parties in 
all cases. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976). An individual who wishes to file a private action can do 
so only after the Secretary has had sixty days to attempt conciliation. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) 
(1976). See note 15 supra. 
40. 113 CONG. REC. 31,254 (1967) (remarks of Senator Javits). 
41. H.R. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in (1978) U.S. CooE CONG. & 
Ao. NEWS 504, 535. 
42. See Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1238 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 
(1978); Brennan v. Ace Hardware Corp., 495 F.2d 368, 373 (8th Cir. 1974); Boddorff v. Pub-
licker Indus., Inc., 488 F. Supp. 1107, 1113 (E.D. Pa. 1980); DeFries v. Haarhues, 488 F. Supp. 
1037, 1043 (C.D. Ill. 1980); EEOC v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 22 Empl. Prac. Dec. 
14,693, 14,694 (W.D. Tenn. 1980); Marshall v. Arlene Knitwear, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 715 
(E.D.N.Y. 1978), qffd in part, revd in part and remanded, 608 F.2d 1369 (2d Cir. 1979); Coates 
v. National Cash Register Co., 433 F. Supp. 655 (W.D. Va. 1977) .. 
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pay awards on a net loss basis.43 
Two other considerations suggest that the measure of deterrence 
added by denying set-offs is unnecessary and insignificant. First, be-
cause the ADEA mandates liquidated damages for willful viola-
tions,44 a net loss measure of damages is not inconsistent with its 
deterrent purpose.45 Although Congress did not envision liquidated 
damages as a punitive remedy,46 it apparently believed that such 
damages would effectively deter willful violations.47 Presumably the 
Act can deter only willful violators, and these will suffer double 
43. Under title VII, which addresses injuries similar to those treated by the ADEA, 
"[i]nterim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons 
discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable." 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-5(g) (1976). This set-off provision covers only two items, actual earnings and amounts 
earnable. Courts are split on whether other set-offs are allowable. For title VII decisions that 
have ordered set-off of unemployment compensation, see, e.g., Marshall v. Communications 
Workers of America, 21 Empl. Prac. Dec. 12,719, 12,721 (D.D.C. 1979); Bowe v. Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 272 F. Supp. 332 (S.D. Ind. 1967). Contra, Abron v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 
439 F. Supp. 1095 (D. Md. 1977); Tidwell v. American Oil Co., 332 F. Supp. 424 (D. Utah 
1971). 
The Supreme Court has acknowledged the "significant differences" between the remedial 
provisions of the ADEA and title VII and expressly rejected the use of title VII analogies for 
the ADEA. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 583-84 (1978). In Lorillard, the defendant argued 
that because title VII does not authorize jury trials, the ADEA should be similarly interpreted. 
Without deciding whether the defendant's reading of title VII was accurate, the Court ruled 
that the analogy was inappropriate. 434 U.S. at 583-85. Although the two statutes have simi-
lar aims and substantive prohibitions, the legislative history of the ADEA illustrates congres-
sional intent to treat age discrimination and title VII discrimination claims differently. See 
113 CONG. REc. 31,254-55 (1967) (remarks of Senator Javits); id. at 34,742 (remarks of Repre-
sentatives Burke and Matsunaga). Congress deliberately incorporated the FLSA's remedial 
provisions in the ADEA, after rejecting other statutory schemes as models. See id. at 31,254 
(remarks of Senator Javits). Senator Javits stated during the floor debates that the enforce-
ment procedures of the ADEA and title VII were meant to operate separately. Id. at 31,255. 
Therefore, courts should not rely unthinkingly on title VII precedent to resolve the issue of set-
offs under the ADEA. Not all courts have recognized this distinction. See EEOC v. Sandia 
Corp., 23 Empl. Prac. Dec. 17,121 (10th Cir. 1980); Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231 (3d 
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978); Wise v. Olan Mills Inc., 495 F. Supp. 257 (D. 
Colo. 1980); Scofield v. Bolts & Bolts Retail Stores, Inc., 20 Empl. Prac. Dec. 12,299 (S.D.N.Y. 
1979); Marshall v. Arlene Knitwear, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), ajfd in part, revd 
in part and remanded, 608 F.2d 1369 (2d Cir. 1979); Buchholz v. Symons Mfg. Co., 445 F. 
Supp. 706 (E.D. Wis. 1978); Coates v. National Cash Register Co., 433 F. Supp. 655 (W.D. Va. 
1977). 
44. See note 15 supra. 
45. For example, Congress intended that the title VII back pay remedy provide "the spur 
or catalyst which causes employers and unions to self-examine and to self-evaluate their em-
ployment practices," Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975) (quoting 
United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 379 (8th Cir. 1973)), yet it did not find set-offs 
inconsistent with that deterrent purpose. See note 43 supra. 
46. See note 41 supra. 
41. See Dean v. American Sec. Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036, 1039-40 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978). Senator Javits observed that "the criminal penalty in cases of 
willful violations has been eliminated and a double liability substituted. This will furnish an 
effective deterrent to willful violations." Age JJiscrimination in Employment: Hearings on S. 
830 and S. 788 Before the Subcomm. on Lobor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Wel-
fare, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1967) (statement of Senator Javits). 
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damages. Second, the uncertainty surrounding set-offs reduces their 
negative effect on deterrence. The amount of allowable set-offs will 
generally depend upon the victim's actions after the discriminatory 
act and will, therefore, be unknown prior to trial. The deterrence 
theory assumes that individuals weigh the anticipated costs and ben-
efits of their conduct before they act, but potential ADEA defend-
ants who rationally calculate their contingent liability before 
discriminating will be unable to rely with certainty on the possibility 
of set-offs. For these reasons, a net loss damages standard should 
not, therefore, undermine the ADEA's deterrent purpose. 
The "make-whole" standard of relief that is compatible with ef-
fective deterrence is the only standard that effectuates the ADEA's 
compensatory purpose.48 Under a make-whole standard, courts at-
tempt to restore the plaintiff to the economic position she would 
have occupied absent the discrimination.49 The ADEA, which pro-
tects only certain pecuniary ''job-related benefits" and not a person's 
overall economic well-being,50 requires courts to apply a modified 
"make-whole" standard. To avoid overcompensation, courts must 
set off from the gross amount of back pay certain benefits, such as 
earnings from another job, that the worker received following the 
discriminatory act. Age discrimination victims are made whole by 
awards that compensate for their net loss - the difference between 
the total ''job-related benefits" lost and those received after the dis-
crimination. To the extent that an individual has received employ-
ment-related income between the time of a discriminatory discharge 
or refusal to hire and the trial,51 she has mitigated the injury that 
Congress designed the Act to redress. Neither fairness nor the 
ADEA's legislative history requires awards in excess of the plaintiff's 
net loss, and such awards unnecessarily burden employers unless de-
terrence is a primary goal. 
II 
Once a court has selected the proper measure of damages under 
the ADEA and decided that some set-offs are appropriate, it must 
choose which of a variety of benefits received by the victim after the 
discrimination should be subtracted from the back pay award. This 
48. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418-22 (1975). 
49. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1238 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 
913 (1978). 
50. See text at notes 26-28 supra. 
51. For a general discussion of the period of back pay liability, see Richards, Monetary 
Awards far Age Discrimination in Employment, 30 ARK. L. REv. 305, 324-26 (1976). 
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Note suggests that, to determine a plaintiffs net loss, courts should 
set off from back pay awards those types of benefits that they would 
have included in damages. 
The employment relation produces a wide variety of economic 
benefits, only some of which an employee receives at any one time. 
When employment is interrupted or terminated, a worker no longer 
collects her salary, but may be entitled to other 'job-related bene-
fits," such as a pension or severance pay. If age discrimination 
reduces or eliminates these benefits, courts should include the loss in 
the ADEA's measure of damages.52 To the extent that such benefits 
replace a discriminatee's salary, her loss of employment-related in-
come is reduced. Thus, the definition of earnings used to identify 
appropriate set-offs should be coextensive with the expansive defini-
tion of earnings used when calculating damages. Courts that apply 
this expansive definition of 'job-related benefits" to compute both 
damages and set-offs would achieve consistent results. 
To effectuate the Act's compensatory purpose, courts should, as a 
general rule, set off from back pay awards not only wages from alter-
native employment, private pension benefits, and severance pay, but 
also unemployment compensation and social security payments.53 
Unemployment and social security benefits are loosely analogous to 
deferred compensation for services.54 The worker's employment en-
titles her to those benefits because only former workers are eligible to 
participate.55 Thus, courts should not distinguish unemployment 
and social security benefits from wages. Awarding a plaintiff gross 
back pay when unemployment insurance and social security pay-
ments have substantially mitigated that loss would make her more 
than whole. Such an award would leave her in a better position than 
she would have achieved had she not been discriminated against, 
and is, therefore, inconsistent with the ADEA's compensatory pur-
pose. 
52. See text at notes 21-25 supra. 
53. The defendant bears the burden of proof on the amount of income received by the 
victim. See Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1243 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 
(1978). 
54. See text at note 23 supra. 
55. See, e.g., N.Y. LAB. LAW§ 596 (McKinney 1976) (unemployment compensation); 42 
U.S.C. §§ 402(a), 414(a) (1976) (social security). "All states require that an individual must 
have earned a specified amount of wages or have worked for a certain period of time, or both, 
to qualify for (unemployment] benefits. These requirements insure that only workers who are 
genuinely attached to the labor force will become eligible for benefits." (1977] 1B UNEMPL. 
INS. REP. (CCH) ~ 1901, at 4386. "In general, social security benefits payable to workers, their 
dependents, or their survivors are based on the earnings record of the worker. . • • [\V]hether 
the worker is 'insured' . . . depends on whether the worker has enough earnings credited to his 
or her account." (1981) I UNEMPL. INS. REP. (CCH) ~ 12,001, at 1013. 
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When applying the ''job-related benefit" standard to calculate 
set-offs, courts must exercise care to set off only those payments that 
represent true gains. In certain situations, a plaintiff may receive 
''job-related benefits" that do not improve her economic position or 
reduce her job-related losses. First, set-offs of gains that a plaintiff 
would have received regardless of the discrimination leave her less 
than whole. For example, when the worker could have held a sec-
ond job in addition to the one from which she was fired, set-off of 
interim earnings is inappropriate because she could have received 
the earnings from both had she not been discharged. 56 Second, some 
payments are simply advances. Many states demand reimbursement 
from workers who obtain back pay awards covering periods in which 
they received unemployment compensation.57 Courts allowing set-
offs of amounts that the plaintiff is not entitled to retain fail to com-
pensate victims fully and, therefore, do not effectuate the ADEA's 
purpose. 
Third, certain retirement benefits may represent no gain to the 
discrimination victim. The social security system, for example, per-
manently reduces payments to persons who retire between ages 
sixty-two and sixty-five.58 An early retiree's benefits are reduced by 
56. See, e.g., Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 317-18 (6th Cir. 1975); DeFries v. 
Haarhues, 488 F. Supp. 1037, 1043-44 (C.D. Ill. 1980). 
57. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT.§ 8-73-110(2); MD. CODE ANN. art. 95A, § 17(d) (1979); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 421.48 (1978); Marshall v. Great Lakes Recreation Co., 2 LAB. L. 
REP. (CCH) 90 Lab. Cas. ~ 33,959 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (applying§ 421.48 to NLRA plaintiff); 
Wise v. Olan Mills Inc., 495 F. Supp. 257, 259 n.3 (D. Colo. 1980) (applying§ 8-73-110(2) to 
ADEA plaintiffs); EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Co., 482 F. Supp. 1291, 1318-19 (N.D. 
Cal. 1979) (applying California law to title VII plaintiff); Katsianos v. ESA, 5 UNEMPL. INS. 
REP. (CCH) ~ 8410 (Md. Ct. Special App. 1979) (applying§ 17(d) to NLRA plaintiff). Some 
courts have applied principles of unjust enrichment or restitution and allowed states to recover 
from employers unemployment compensation paid to employees whose back pay awards were 
reduced by the amount of such compensation. See, e.g., State v. Rucker, 211 Md. 153, 126 
A.2d 846 (1956); State v. Continental Baking Co., 72 Wash. 2d 138,431 P.2d 993 (1967). These 
decisions rest on state public policy and do not affect this Note's argument. 
Even in states without payback provisions, unemployment compensation benefits received 
may not represent gains. The hypothetical case of a plaintiff who was discriminatorily dis-
charged and received unemployment compensation illustrates this point. Six months later the 
plant in which she formerly worked was shut down and all the employees permanently laid off. 
In her suit to recover back pay for the six months she should have been allowed to work, the 
court should not set off her unemployment benefits. "All state unemployment insurance laws 
contain provisions limiting the period over which unemployment benefits can be paid to a 
given claimant. Although the manner in which this is done varies from state to state, the most 
common maximum duration of benefits - exclusive of additional, extended-duration benefits 
- is 26 weeks." (1981] 1B UNEMPL. INS. REP. (CCH) ~ 1935. If she had not been discrimina-
torily discharged, the plaintiff would have exhausted her benefits after the plant closing. For 
this reason, she would have received the same amount of unemployment benefits regardless of 
the firing, and the benefits received covering the six-month period before the plant closing do 
not constitute a net gain. 
58. 42 U.S.C. §§ 402{a), 402(q) (1976). 
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an actuarily calculated59 fractional amount60 designed to equalize 
the gross amount of payments received by early-retiring workers and 
workers retiring at age sixty-five. An employee who retires early will 
receive more payments than if she had retired at the normal age. 
However, the amount of each payment is reduced so that these addi-
tional payments do not represent a net gain. The social security sys-
tem has already set off whatever additional benefits the plaintiff 
would have received by retiring early. Allowing the employer to set 
off early retirement benefits would create a double reduction and the 
award would thus fail to compensate fully.61 For this reason, courts 
should not set off social security payments that workers receive 
before age sixty-five or similarly-reduced private pension benefits.62 
These problems suggest a need to refine further the ''job-related ben-
efits" standard. To avoid over-compensation of discrimination vic-
tims, courts should set off from back pay awards only those ''job-
related benefits" that actually improve plaintiffs' economic positions. 
59. See H.R. REP. No. 231, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 46, reprinted in [1972) U.S. CODE CONG, & 
Ao. NEWS 4989, 5032. 
60. Social security payments are reduced by five-ninths of one percent for each month 
prior to age sixty-five. Under this system, a worker who retires at age sixty-two receives 80% of 
the monthly amount she would have received had she waited until age sixty-five to retire. 42 
u.s.c. § 402(q) (1976). 
The social security system also permanently increases benefits for those who delay retire-
ment past sixty-five by one-twelfth or one-fourth of one percent for each month that retirement 
is delayed. 42 U.S.C. § 402(w) (1976 & Supp. II 1978). See [1980) l UNEMPL. INS. REP. 
(CCH) ~ 12,229. However, because the late-retirement credit is not actuarily calculated, see 
Letter from Boyd S. Mast, actuary with William M. Mercer, Inc. (March l, 1981) (on file with 
the Michigan Law Review), an individual who delays retirement past age sixty-five will receive 
a lower gross amount of benefits than if she had retired at sixty-five. Thus, social security 
benefits received by individuals over age sixty-five do constitute an actual benefit that should 
be set off against the back pay award despite loss of the late retirement credit. 
61. The hypothetical case of a sixty-two year old woman whose salary and fringe benefits 
total $120 per year illustrates this point. If she had continued working until age sixty-five, she 
would be entitled to social security benefits (ignoring cost-of-living increases) of $100 per year. 
Because she was discriminatorily discharged and could find no other employment, her yearly 
benefit level is reduced to $80. See note 60 supra. In the three years before she turned sixty-
five she would have earned $360 in wages and benefits; instead she received $240 in social 
security payments. Although set-off of that $240 would seemingly put her in the same position 
she would have attained at age sixty-five, it will actually reduce her total level of •~ob-related 
benefits." Had she retired at age sixty-five, she would have received $500 in social security 
payments before age seventy; instead she receives only $400 in that five-year period and will 
receive reduced amounts for the rest of her life. This difference is justified only because she 
received the $240 before age sixty-five. Setting off those early retirement benefits will, there-
fore, leave her less well off than she would have been absent the discrimination and frustrate 
the ADEA's compensatory objective. 
62. Actuaries and economists may dispute the proposition that the actuarily calculated 
reductions under social security or private pension plans are accurate and the corollary that 
early retirement results in no additional benefit to the plaintiff. The cost of such expert testi-
mony on the relative value of retirement benefits would be prohibitive, however, except in 
cases involving substantial numbers of employees. Without the aid of experts, the court may 
have no choice but to assume that Congress accurately calculated the reduction to insure that 
---an early retiree's total benefits will be no more valuable than if she had retired at age sixty-five. 
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Some set-offs would be disallowed even under this refined stan-
dard. Because back-pay awards do not compensate for nonemploy-
ment-related losses other than through liquidated damages,63 gains 
that are not job-related, such as public assistance payments, are in-
appropriate set-off items. Even the ADEA's liquidated damages 
provision does not attempt to assess actual damages. Congress in-
stead directed that willful violators pay liquidated damages in an 
amount equal to the back pay award.64 Congress's message is that 
the ADEA does not redress every injury caused by a discriminatory 
act. To the extent that a discriminatee has additional leisure time 
after being discharged, she may be better off. To the extent that she 
suffers psychic distress from unemployment, she is worse off. Yet the 
ADEA takes neither of these into account. Rather, "[t]he Act draws 
its parameters of protected interests around the pecuniary employ-
ment relationship between the employer and the employee,"65 and 
does not inquire into the plaintiff's overall economic and personal 
well-being. For this reason, courts that set off gains that are not de-
rived from an employment relation will not fully compensate for 
job-related losses. 
One example demonstrates how set-offs of nonemployment-re-
lated benefits will lead to undercompensation. The ADEA does not 
authorize recovery of consequential damages for pain, suffering, or 
medical expenses. 66 If a victim has received private insurance bene-
fits that compensate for such damages, her overall economic well-
being is improved. However, because the insurance compensates for 
losses that were not included in the damage calculation, a court that 
refuses to set it off against a back pay award does not create a wind-
fall for the plaintiff. Only if the court refuses to set off such amounts 
will the plaintiff receive all the ''job-related benefits" to which she is 
entitled. Thus public assistance payments,67 private gratuities, pay-
ments from individually acquired insurance policies, and similar 
benefits should not be set off because they do not accrue through 
employment. The only court to consider this issue refused to set off 
63. See Rogers v. Exxon Research & Engr. Co., 550 F.2d 834,841 (3d Cir. 1977) (''The Act 
provides for determination of the amount of damages by an objective test - the amount of lost 
earnings"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978). 
64. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1976) (incorporated into the ADEA by 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976)). 
65. Sant v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 621, 622 (N.D. Cal. 1976). 
66. See note 28 supra. 
67. This category of payments encompasses receipts from such programs as Aid to Fami-
lies with Dependent Children, see, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW§ 343 (McKinney 1976), and 
Food Stamps, authorized by 7 U.S.C. § 2011 (1976). 
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unearned benefits. 68 
Although refusing to set off unearned benefits is consistent with 
judicial statements that ADEA damages should make whole the 
plaintiffs earnings, refusing to set off earned benefits is not. How-
ever, many courts have failed to set off earned benefits such as unem-
ployment compensation and social security payments, arguing that 
these amounts are "collateral benefits,"69 and are awarded in fur-
therance of a "separate social policy."70 Although the common-law 
collateral source doctrine may justify these decisions,71 they find no 
support either in logic or in the ADEA's policies. First, at least some 
of these courts suggested that they would set off wages from other 
employment,72 although such interim earnings are no less "collat-
eral." The common law is itself inconsistent on this point since it 
calls for deduction of actual earnings when computing damages for 
breach of an employment contract.73 If courts set off earnings, they 
cannot distinguish ''job-related benefits" on the ground that they 
come from a source other than the defendant employer. More im-
portantly, courts that apply the collateral source rule fail to effectu-
ate the ADEA's policies. The ADEA's compensatory goal is not 
68. See EEOC v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 22 Empl. Prac. Dec. 14,693 (\V.D. Tenn. 
1980). The court set off actual earnings and unemployment compensation but not public 
assistance payments. 22 Empl. Prac. Dec. at 14,694. The court noted that public assistance 
payments were not sufficiently analogous to actual earnings to require set-off. 22 Empl. Prac. 
Dec. at 14, 694. Welfare benefits are not "analogous" to actual earnings because the right to 
receive public assistance is not earned through employment. 
69. Marshall v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 554 F.2d 730, 736 (5th Cir. 1977); Wise v. 
Olan Mills Inc., 495 F. Supp. 257, 259-60 (D. Colo. 1980); Scofield v. Bolts & Bolts Retail 
Stores, Inc., 20 Empl. Prac. Dec. 12,299 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Marshall v. Arlene Knitwear, Inc., 
454 F. Supp. 715, 730-31 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), qffd. in part, revd. in part and remanded, 608 F.2d 
1369 (2d Cir. 1979). 
70. EEOC v. Sandia Corp., 23 Empl. Prac. Dec. 17,121, 17,140 (10th Cir. 1980). 
71. The weight of common-law authority is that collateral amounts are not deducted from 
a damage a'Yard, even where payment has beep. received from a fund supported in part by 
contributions of the defendant. F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS§ 25.22, at 154 
nn.5-6 (Supp. 1968). In a number of states, where the collateral source is derived wholly from 
the employer's contributions, set-offs for payments from the fund will be required. See EEOC 
v. Enterprise Assoc. Steamfitters Local No. 638, 542 F.2d 579, 591 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 
430 U.S. 911 (1977). Since social security benefits are funded by both employer and employee 
contributions, see [1979] 1 UNEMPL. INS. REP. (CCH) ~ 10,200, the common law supports 
denial of a set-off. And although unemployment compensation is funded solely by taxes on 
employers, see lB UNEMPL. INS. REP. (CCH) ~ 1001, the defendant is not the only employer 
that pays the tax, and benefits to its discharged employees are not limited to the amounts it 
paid. See NLRB v. Marshall Field & Co., 129 F.2d 169, 173 (7th Cir.), qffd. per curiam, 318 
U.S. 253 (1942). Courts following the common law would, therefore, refuse to set off unem-
ployment compensation as well. 
72. Wise v. Olan Mills Inc., 495 F. Supp. 257, 259-60 (D. Colo. 1980); Scofield v. Bolts & 
Bolts Retail Stores, Inc., 20 Empl. Prac. Dec. 12,299 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Marshall v. Arlene Knit-
wear, 454 F. Supp. 715, 730-31 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), qffd. in part, revd. in part and remanded, 608 
F.2d 1369 (2d Cir. 1979). 
73. See C. McCORMICK, supra note 30, at § 160. 
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furthered by awarding a sum of money greater than the amount that 
will make the plaintiff whole from a fund to which the defendant has 
contributed. 74 
The fact that unemployment compensation and social security 
payments are based on "separate social policies"75 does not require a 
different result. In fact, it is irrelevant. These payments constitute 
''job-related benefits," receipt of which mitigates the only losses that 
the ADEA seeks to redress.76 To effectuate the ADEA's compensa-
tory purpose, courts should not inquire into possible windfalls to em-
ployers. Allocation of the burden of compensation between the state 
or federal government and the defendant employer is not affected by 
a back pay award. Denial of a set-off for unemployment compensa-
tion or social security payments does not return the sums received by 
the plaintiff to the state or federal treasury, but only insures double 
compensation. Because governments can easily alter the allocation 
of the compensation burden, 77 courts should ask only what is neces-
sary to make the plaintiff whole and forsake inquiries into what the 
defendant deserves to pay.1s 
Despite the shortcomings of the collateral source doctrine, many 
courts continue to deny set-offs of unemployment compensation and 
social security benefits. Both the Fifth and Tenth Circuits have mis-
takenly relied on NLRJJ v. Gullett Gin Co. ,79 which correctly held 
that set-offs are discretionary with the court, to reach this result. so 
Reliance on Gullett Gin is misplaced because the Supreme Court was 
construing the National Labor Relations Act81 (NLRA), which Con-
gress considered and rejected as a model for the ADEA.82 Gullett 
74. q. EEOC v. Enterprise Assoc. Steamfitters Local No. 638, 542 F.2d 579, 592 (2d Cir. 
1976) (title VII case), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 911 (1977); Marshall v. Communication Workers 
of America, 21 EmpL Prac. Dec. 12,719, at 12,721 (D.D.C. 1979) (title VII case). As the 
Steam.fitters court concluded: 
We see no compelling reason for providing the injured party with double recovery for his 
lost employment; no compelling reason of deterrence or retribution against the responsi-
ble party in this case; and we are not in the business of redistributing the wealth beyond 
the goal of making the victim of discrimination whole. 
542 F.2d at 592. 
75. See text at note 70 supra. 
76. See text at notes 20-28 supra. 
77. See note 57 supra and accompanying text. 
78. See generally Note, Unreason in the Law of Damages: The Collateral Source Rule, 77 
HARV. L. REV. 741, 748-49 (1964). 
79.-340 U.S. 361 (1951). 
80. See EEOC v. Sandia Corp., 23 Emp. Prac. Dec. 17,121 (10th Cir. 1980); Marshall v. 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 554 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1977). 
81. 29 u.s.c. § 151 (1976). 
82. H.R. REP. No. 805, supra note 39, at 5, [1967] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 2220; 
s. REP. No. 723, supra note 39, 113 CONG. REc. at 31,250; 113 CONG. REc. 34,745 (1967) 
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Gin merely held that the NLRB did not exceed its authority in fail-
ing to deduct unemployment benefits from a back pay award; the 
Court did not imply that a decision in favor of deducting unemploy-
ment benefits would have been an abuse of discretion. 83 Moreover, 
the Court held that "[s]ince no consideration has been given ... to 
collateral losses in framing an order to reimburse employees for their 
lost earnings, manifestly no consideration need be given to collateral 
benefits which employees may have received."84 Because ADEA 
damages compensate for the loss of 'Job-related benefits" such as 
unemployment compensation, this aspect of Gullett Gin's reasoning 
is inapposite. 85 
The discretion sanctioned by Gullett Gin must be "guided by 
sound legal principles."86 The ADEA authorizes courts to "grant 
such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the 
purposes of [the Act]."87 Although stated in broad terms, the limita-
tion should be observed. In determining the proper scope of discre-
tion, a court must give great weight to the objective sought to be 
accomplished by the statute. 88 A district court must be reversed 
when it fails to exercise discretion with an eye to the purposes of an 
act. 89 Courts should decide whether or not to set off unemployment 
compensation and other income from back pay awards in accord-
ance with congressional intent. The measure of damages identified 
by this Note as most consistent with the ADEA's purposes requires 
courts to set off all 'job-related benefits" that represent a true gain to 
the plaintiff and deny set-offs of other income. 
(remarks of Rep. Reid) ("Rather than utilizing enforcement procedures patterned after the 
National Labor Relations Act, [the ADEA] adopted the recommendation of our bill to follow 
essentially the well-tested compliance mechanisms of the Fair Labor Standards Act. This ap-
proach emphasizes conciliation, conference, and persuasion before permitting the Secretary of 
Labor to move directly to the U.S. district courts in a civil action".). See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 
U.S. 575, 578 (1978). 
83. See Marshall v. Communications Workers of Am., 21 Empl. Prac. Dec. 12,719, 12,720-
21 (D.D.C. 1979). 
84. NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361, 364 (1951) (emphasis in original). 
85. Gui/ell Gin does, however, support this Note's argument that public assistance pay-
ments should not be set off. 
86. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 416 (1975) (quoting United States v. 
Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 35 (No. 14,692d) (C.C. Va. 1807) (Marshall, C.J.)). 
87. 29 u.s.c. § 626(b) (1976). 
88. See Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 331 (1944); Head v. Timken Roller Bearing 
Co., 486 F.2d 870, 877 (6th Cir. 1973). 
89. See Shultz v. Parke, 413 F.2d 1364, 1368 (5th Cir. 1969); Wirtz v. B.B. Saxon Co., 365 
F.2d 457, 462-63 (5th Cir. 1966). 
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CONCLUSION 
During the ADEA's first ten years, 15,000 victims of age discrim-
ination were owed more than $51 million in damages,90 yet Congress 
has not clearly instructed courts how to calculate monetary relief. 
Consistent with the ADEA's conciliatory approach to age discrimi-
nation, this Note has proposed a refined make-whole theory that 
compensates victims fully to the extent contemplated by Congress 
while creating the least burden on business. Courts should compen-
sate ADEA plaintiffs for the loss of all employment-related income, 
including lost unemployment compensation and social security ben-
efits. At the same time, the courts must recognize that receipt of such 
benefits mitigates a plaintiff's loss, and reduce back pay awards ac-
cordingly. Consistent application of the 'job-related benefits" con-
cept to the calculation of damages and set-offs will best effectuate 
Congress's intent and bring a much-needed element of certainty to 
ADEA cases. 
90. See EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, RE-
PORT COVERING ACTIVITIES UNDER ADEA DURING 1978, at 4 (1979). 
